Time to expand the Fed's role in retail payments: President's message by Thomas M. Hoenig
he migration of consumers from paper 
checks to credit and debit card networks 
has been only a part of the story in the 
area of retail payments. Over the past 
decade we have also seen a significant change 
in  the  competitive  environment  among 
payments service providers with consolidation 
across  the  industry.  While  new  entrants  are 
providing services on the front or back end of 
the payments clearing process, the market for 
clearing payments transactions between senders 
and  receivers  is  increasingly  concentrated, 
dominated by a few very large providers. 
The  march  toward  consolidation  has 
been going on for some time. In 1995, the 
largest  three  networks  combined  controlled 
approximately  50  percent  of  the  PIN  debit 
volume.  That figure rose to roughly 80 percent 
in a little more than a decade.  Perhaps more 
striking  is  that  over  the  same  period,  the 
number  of  networks  dropped  from  around   
30 to 14.   
This  evolution  is  not  surprising  given 
the  economics—high  costs  associated  with 
providing a network service that is sufficiently 
secure, highly available and resilient, and able 
to  connect  thousands  of  banks  and  credit 
unions across the United States. This level of 
market concentration, however, raises serious 
issues  in  the  areas  of  pricing,  access  and 
security/resiliency.  For the benefit of all market 
participants, from the consumers through the 
financial institutions, I believe it is crucial that 
the Federal Reserve consider expanding its role 
in this area.
In card payments, the Federal Reserve has 
historically been confined to consumer protec-
tion issues. The card networks, which devel-
oped privately as tools for accessing bank lines 
of credit, have long since expanded far beyond 
their initial role, with electronic payments now 
exceeding two-thirds of all 
noncash  payments  in  the 
United  States.  Looking 
more broadly at the over-
all  payments  system,  this 
rise  in  card  transactions 
means a growing share of 
payments are clearing via 
an  increasingly  concen-
trated market of networks 
focused  on  maximizing 
shareholder  profits  and 
not  necessarily  on  ensur-
ing broad access and suf-
ficient levels of security and resiliency. 
Among other concerns, this concentration 
provides significant pricing leverage that works 
in favor of the networks and has little benefit 
to  consumers  or  other  system  participants. 
Beyond the competition issues, there are also 
important  system  resiliency  questions.  Card 
market service buyers are not afforded the same 
safety net as check and Automated Clearing 
House (ACH) customers, who can rely on the 
Federal Reserve as an operator in times of crisis. 
This issue is increasingly important as we see 
complex systems controlled by fewer operators 
—a combination that raises the vulnerability of 
the entire system to “single points of failure.” 
To some, the idea of the Federal Reserve 
taking  an  active  role  in  electronic  payments 
networks might seem to reverse the usual path of 
marketplace evolution. Generally, competition 
between  the  public  and  private  sector  has 
been in areas where there was a government 
monopoly and where it was clear competition 
would  bring  benefits—parcel  shipping  is 
perhaps  the  most  visible  example.  A  move 
by the Federal Reserve to compete with the 
card payment networks would bring another 
participant into a business where exceedingly 
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high entry costs block the emergence of new 
competitors, but it would also have numerous 
additional benefits.  
Historically,  the  Federal  Reserve’s  active 
participation in the payments system has been 
focused on checks and ACH payments. The 
Federal Reserve does not seek to maximize its 
profits, rather it is required by law to recover all 
related operating costs as well as interest, taxes 
and  return  on  equity  comparable  to  private 
sector  participants.  In  addition,  the  Federal 
Reserve focuses on improving payments system 
efficiency and providing financial institutions 
and their customers broad access to payments 
products at a competitive price, and in doing 
so, it provides benefits beyond acting as simply 
another  competitor.  For  example,  the  Fed 
was instrumental in lowering the cost of the 
payments system by being first to the market 
with services that enabled financial institutions 
large and small to take advantage of electronic 
checks. Also, in times of crisis, the Fed stands 
ready  to  make  its  services  available  to  any 
financial institution as a reliable alternative to 
their current service provider. 
Finally,  of  course,  there  are  the  benefits 
of the insights the Federal Reserve obtains by 
being  a  provider  versus  solely  a  regulator  in 
this  important  component  of  our  economic 
infrastructure. In many countries, the central 
bank  carries  out  its  payments  system  policy 
mandate by regulating rather than competing 
in the retail payments market. By participating 
in the market as a provider, not only does the 
Fed  influence  pricing  that  otherwise  might 
tend toward monopolistic, but also it can gain 
and share hands on knowledge and  insights 
into  the  impact  of  proposed  regulations 
and  policies  on  businesses,  consumers  and 
banks that would not be possible with solely 
a  regulatory  oversight  role.  This  ability  to 
understand  and  influence  industry  standards 
that promote efficiency in payments processing 
and ultimately benefit the public, has a long 
history  going  back  to  the  introduction  of 
MICR line standards in the early automation 
of check processing in the 1950s and 1960s.   
Most recently, we have worked with financial 
institutions,  software  vendors  and  payments 
processors to improve electronic check clearing 
processes and standards. 
Because  the  Federal  Reserve  is  charged 
with  promoting  the  efficiency,  integrity  and 
accessibility of the payments system, subject to 
the constraints of full cost recovery as required 
by law, we are well-positioned to remain an 
active  provider  of  retail  payment  clearing 
services. Such a role is important in ensuring 
that we preserve the value that has been derived 
by our past involvement in such areas as access, 
efficiency and resiliency.   Additionally, there are 
the important benefits of acting as a safety net, 
actively participating in setting standards and 
gaining important market insight. Given the 
inherent risk in payments, the consolidation of 
service providers and the increasing reliance on 
electronic payments, the Federal Reserve’s role 
as an operator has become even more critical. It 
is time to expand our role in this market.
This column originally appeared in the trade  
publication “E-Finance & Payments Law & Policy.“